War, the military, COIN and stuff

Unmanned, Underground, Uncovered

One of the things that the Wikileaks diplomatic cables open up to view is the complicated and shadowy world of international arms transfers--how one sale might lead to another, and then another to an unfriendly power, or how two companies from different countries  might actually provide banned items to a third party. It's hardly shocking that these things happen, but it's facinating to see how they're handled quietly though some diplomatic arm-twisting.

One State Dept. cable from March 24, 2009 titled “SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA” shows how tight of a lid U.S. intelligence agencies are trying to keep on the export of arms to and from nations it considers unfriendly. The report states that

Venezuelan officials expected to receive a shipment of UNMANNED aerial vehicles (UAV) and related material from Iran, via Turkey, by May 2009. As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela. The U.S. believes this shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5.

In January 2009, acting on another tip from U.S. officials, the Turkish government stopped an Iranian attempt to ship drums of nitrate and sulphite chemicals and dismantled laboratory instruments to Venezuela, by shipping them through Turkey.

Read the rest at ARES...

Secretary Gates on Wikileaks

In the Q&A portion of the press conference unveiling the Pentagon's landmark Don't Ask Don't Tell survery, Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen took questions on the other big story this week -- the publication of over 200,000 stolen diplomatic cables sent by American officials overseas which has been been blowing up front pages all week. (Actually, less than 300 cables have been published so far, in a strategy that Wikileaks is using to keep the story "fresh" for as long as it can.) While Gates and Mullen and a host of other DoD officials have commented on the leak, Gates' comments yesterday were pretty remarkable.

If you'll allow me to quote at length,it's worth reading the whole thing.

    First of all, I would say unlike the Pentagon Papers, one of the things that is important, I think, in all of these releases, whether it’s Afghanistan, Iraq or the releases this week, is the lack of any significant difference between what the U.S. government says publicly and what these things show privately, whereas the Pentagon Papers showed that many in the government were not only lying to the American people, they were lying to themselves.

But let me – let me just offer some perspective as somebody who’s been at this a long time.  Every other government in the world knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has for a long time.  And I dragged this up the other day when I was looking at some of these prospective releases.  And this is a quote from John Adams:  “How can a government go on, publishing all of their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not. To me, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel.”

When we went to real congressional oversight of intelligence in the mid-’70s, there was a broad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again if we were going to share it all with the Congress.  Those fears all proved unfounded.

Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on.  I think – I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought.  The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets.  

Many governments – some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us.  We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us.  They will continue to work with us.  We will continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing?  Yes.  Is it awkward?  Yes.  Consequences for U.S. foreign policy?  I think fairly modest.

Published at ARES...

Security Contractors, Coalition Comms, and Friendly Fire

Even with all of the communications, sensor and intelligence-gathering technologies at the disposal of the modern U.S. military, the battlefield continues to be a crowded, fast-moving, and confusing place. The notion of the “fog of war” may be a cliché, but it’s one that persists despite centuries of effort to clear it up -- and when you add civilian security contractors to the mix, it becomes even more complex.

It is essentially taken as a given that in future military operations, civilian contractors will—as they have in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Kosovo—work alongside American and allied forces providing everything from labor to support to security missions. The New York Times has done a good job combing through the Wikileaks files for material that captures the contractors’ role in Iraq, but there’s more.

The Times found that during the six years covered by the Wikileaks reports, “at least 175 private security contractors were killed. The peak appeared to come in 2006, when 53 died. Insurgents and other malefactors kidnapped at least 70 security contractors, many of whom were later killed.” Steve Fainaru did a great job capturing the disorganization surrounding some of the smaller, sketchier security outfits in his book, Big Boy Rules, but even when it comes to the large security companies, mistakes happened. Mistakes like shooting at, or being shot at, by the U.S. and coalition forces.

In one “White-on-Blue” incident exposed by Wikileaks, trucks from security contractor Armor Group was fired on by an American convoy when it tried to pass the military trucks on the highway. The contractor “had previously understood signals…to means that he was cleared to pass.” No one was hurt. In another incident, an American convoy “inadvertently engaged a civilian contractor security element” after two Ford trucks approached the convoy. The trucks were hit three times before U.S. forces realized that they were friendly. No one was hurt.

One hindrance in performing operations as part of an international coalition is the inability to speak to your allies, since different countries use different communications technologies. In Iraq, this led to some hairy moments early in the war between coalition military forces.

 In April 2004, Polish troops in Karbala fired warning shots at “a fast approaching vehicle packet,” which returned fire before turning around. When the convoy turned, the Polish troops recognized the trucks as American Humvees belonging to the Military Police. An investigation found that one coalition troop was lightly injured and the incident occurred because of a “lack of radio communications” between the MP patrol and the traffic control point. In July 2004 the it was the Americans turn to fire on the Poles in Karbala when “unknown vehicles” approached their position one evening. Unaware that any Polish convoy was in the area, and unable to make verbal contact with the vehicles, the Poles withdrew, and no one was hurt.

Please read the rest over at ARES...

How Wikileaks Exposes a New Mission for the Infantry

Given some of the explosive, and some not so explosive, revelations about security contractors, detainee abuse, Iranian involvement, etc. contained in the Wikileaks document dump on Friday afternoon, quite a lot is bound to get overlooked. One of the things I’ve long wondered about is what happens when an Unmanned Air Vehicle crashes in a combat zone – and how prevalent are crashes?

Scanning through the leaked documents over the weekend, it’s interesting to note a new mission that UAVs have helped to invent for infantrymen – UAV recovery. The relevant documents tell the tale of Quick Reaction Forces and patrols being sent out, or rerouted from ongoing missions, to try and recover or locate UAVs that had gone down. In report after report, often unidentified unmanned assets—the only models consistently named are catapult-launched RQ-7 Shadow, the RQ-2 Pioneer, and the hand-launched RQ-14 Dragon’s Eye—lose contact with their ground controllers and go missing, and grunts are sent out the gate to see what they can find. It’s a new mission set for the infantry not seen in previous conflicts, but given the expense and the technologies onboard the aircraft, one that is obviously considered important enough by commanders to put their soldiers’ lives at risk.

Not surprising to note that while American troops are eager to get their assets back, Iraqis are just as anxious to get their hands on these pieces of high-tech gear that fall from the sky. One report from April 2005 notes that after a UAV crashed in a baghdad backyard, it was picked up by a black car before U.S troops could arrive at the scene.....

Read the rest of this post over at ARES...